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Monte~ey, California 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the dependence of the structure of optimal time-sequential 
fire-support policies on the quantification of military objectives by considering 
four specific problems, each corresponding to a different quantiiication of objec- 
tives (i.e. criterion functional). We consider the optimal time-sequential allocation 
of supporting fires during the "approach to contact" of friendly infantry against 
enemy defensive positions. The combat dynamics are modelled by deterministic 
Lanchester-type equations of warfare, and the optimal fire-support policy for each 
one-sided combat optimization p~oblem is developed via optimal control theory. 
The problems are all nonconvex, and local optima are a particular di5culty in one 
of them. For the same combat dynamics, the splitting of supporting &es between 
t*o enemy forces in any optimal policy (i.e. the opt ia l i ty  of singular subarcs) 
is shown to depend only on whether the terminal payoff reflects the objective of 
attaining an "overall" military advantage or a "local" one. Additionally, switching 
times for changes in the ranking of target priorities are shown to be different (some- 
times significantly) when the decision criterion is the difference and the ratio of the 
military worths (computed accolding to linear utilities) of total infantry survivors 
and also the difference and the ratio of the military worths of the combatants' 
total infantry losses. Thus, the optimal fie-support policy for this attack scenario 
is shown to be significantly influenced by the quantification of military objectives. 
1. INTRODUCTION 9 
As one of the authors has pointed out in [40], for the purposes of military operations research 
i t  is convenient to consider that there are three essential parts of any time-sequential combat 
optimization problem : 
(a) the decision criteria (for both combatants), 
(b) the model of conflict termination (and/or unit breakpoints), 
(c) the model of combat dynamics. 
An important problem of military operations research is the determination of the relationship 
between the nature of system objectives and the structure of optimal combat strategies. Of particu- 
*This research was partially supported by the Office of Naval Research. The authors wish to thank the referee 
for his helpful suggestions. A slightly expanded version of this paper (with numerous annotations elaborating upon 
various points) has appeared in report form as [45]. 
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lar importance is the sensitivity of the structure of optimal combat strategies to the nature of 
military objectives (see 1291 for a discussion of the influences of political objectives on military ob- 
jectives for the evaluation of (timesequential) combat strategies). I n  a time-sequential combat 
optimization problem the combatant objectives are quantified through the criterion functional 
[8]. If the optimal combat strategy and associated payoff are quite sensitive to the functional form 
of the criterion functional, then care must be exercised in the selection of-_the fun@ional form. 
An important constituent part of fire support is the target allocation function which matches 
a specific weapon type with an acquired target within the target's environment [25]. It is not sur- 
prising then that the determination of optimal target allocation strageties for supporting weapon 
systems [48] is (in one form or another) one of the most extensively studied problems in both the 
open literature [42, 431 and also classified sources. During World War I1 the problem of the ap- 
propriate mixture of tactical and strategic air forces (another aspect of the optimal fire-support 
strategy problem) was extensively debated by experts. Some analysis details are to be found in the 
classic book by Morse and Kimball (see pp. 73-77 of [27]). This problem was further studied a t  
RAND in the late 1940's and early 2950's [I 31 and elsewhere [3]. I t  would probably not be too far- 
fetched to say that this problem stimulated early research on both dynamic programming [4] and 
also differential games [13, 181. Today the problem of the determination of optimal air-war strate- 
gies (another aspect of the fire-support problem) is being rather extensively studied by a number of 
organizations 11, 2, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 22, 461. 
Thus, the objective of this investigation is to determine the sensitivity of the optimal time- 
sequential fire-support policy to the functional form of the criterion functional. Our research 
approach is to combine Lanchester-type models of warfare (see, for example, [34, 38,401 and refer- 
ences contained therein) with generalized control theory [15, 161 (i.e. optimization theory for 
dynamic systems). This general research program has been described in more detail elsewhere 
[40,41]. It seems appropriate to examine sensitivity of the optimal policy by considering a concrete 
problem. Consequently, our research approach is to consider several different criterion functionals 
for the same tactical situation involving the allocation of supporting fires. The tactical situation 
that we have chosen to examine is the "approach to contact" during an assault on enemy defensive 
positions by friendly ground forces. We seek to determine the "bestJJ allocation for the supporting 
fies of the friendly forces. Weiss [48] has emphasized that a simpMed model of s combat situation 
* is particularly valuable when it leads to a clearer understanding of significant relationships which 
would tend to be obscured in a more complex model. Consequently, we will consider a mathemati- 
cally tractable version of this problem so that we can make quantitative comparisons among the 
optimal policies corresponding to the various criterion functionals; Corresponding to each different 
criterion functional is a different optimization (here, optimal control) problem. Each of these 
problems has been solved, and the corresponding optimal fire-support policies will be contrasted. 
In this paper four different criterion functionals are considered: it is shown that both the 
diierence and the ratio of military worths of friendly and enemy survivors (computed according 
to linear utilities) and also the ratio of the military worths of friendly and enemy losses as criterion 
functionals may lead to exmay the same optimd policy. A completely different optimal policy, 
however, is obtained for the weighted average of force ratios of opposing infantry (at the time that 
the supporting fires are lifted) as the criterion functional. We have decided that the three former 
criterion functionals (i.e. the difference and the ratio of the military worths of survivors and the 
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ratio of the military worths of losses) are appropriate for an "attritionJJ objective,* whereas the 
weighted average of force ratios is appropriate for a "breakthroughJJ objective. t (In the latter case, 
the attacking force tries to overpower the defenders a t  one place along a front and then pour 
reinforcements through the break in the defender's defenses in order to "penetrateJJ behind the 
enemy lines and, for example, disrupt enemy command, control, and -comgmnjcations.) 
The body of this paper is organized in the following fashion. First, we review previous work 
on the relationship between the quantification of military objectives and the structure of optimal 
time-sequential fire-distribution policies in order to place the work at hand in proper perspective. 
Then we describe the fire-support problem and discuss th'e four criterion functionals that will be 
used to determine optimal fire-support policies. Each of these criterion functionals represents a 
different quantification of military objectives, and all appear to be reasonable criteria. Next, the 
optimal fire-support policies are described for the four problems. The structures of the four optimal 
policies are then contrasted. Next, we justify the optimization results that we have been discussing 
by sketching their development via modern optimal control theory. This development is given 
for each of the four problems. Finally, we discuss what we have learned from our investigation of 
the dependence of the structure of optimal fire-support policies on the quantification of military 
objectives. 
2. PREVIOUS WORK ON THE STRUCTURE OF OPTIMAL FIRE-DISTRIBUTION POLICIES 
The only systematic examinations of the irduences of the nature of the criterion function on 
the structure of optimal time-sequential firedistribution strategies known to the authors are those 
of Taylor [30-33,35,37,40,43]. In [31] and [40], however, the influences of the nature of the target- 
type attrition process on the structure of optimal firedistribution policies were examined. In  
[30-331 and [40] a linear utility$ was assumed for the military worth of the number of each surviving 
weapon system type, and the criterion functional (payoff) was taken to be the net military worth of 
survivors (i.e. the difference between the military worths of friendly and enemy forces). Taylor 
[30-33,40] has studied how the optimal fire-distribution policy depends on the assignment of these 
linear utilities. In other words, he examined the sensitivity of the optima& combat policy to para- 
metric variations in the assigned linear utilities for survivors. It has been shown that the n-versus- 
one fire-distribution problems studied in [30-331 all have quite simple solutions when enemy 
survivors are valued in direct proportion to their kill capabilities (as measured by their Lanchester 
attrition-rate coefficients [34, 381 against the (homogeneous) friendly forces). 
Pugh and Maybeny [29] have suggested that a appropriate payoff, or objective function (in 
our terminology, criterion functional) for the quantitative evaluation of combat strategies is the 
loss ratio (calculated possibly using weighting factors for heterogeneous forces). They have stated 
*In other words, the friendly forces seek an "overall1J military advantage. 
iIn other words, the friendly forces seek a r'local'J military advantage. 
$ See [I?] for the methodology for the development of these h e a r  utiities. For optimal control difIerential game 
combat optimization problems, the assumption of linear utilities yields that the boundary conditions for the adjoint- 
variables (at least when no terminal state constraint is active) are independent of the values of the state variables. 
Serious computational difficulties may arise when nonlinear utilities are assumed. The effects of assuming nonlinear 
utilities for military resources upon the evaluation of time-sequential combat strategies has apparently never 
been studied. 
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[29J that an "almost equivalentJJ criterion is the loss difference. However, Pugh and Mayberry 
[29] do not explore the consequences of various functional forms for the criterion functiond. In this 
paper we will examine to what extent these criteria are, in fact, equivalent. In  combat problems 
with either no repIacements or a fixed-length planning horizon, it is readily seen that minimking 
the loss difference is the same as maximizing. the difference in survivors. I t  is such a case of no 
replacements that we will examine here. It remains to determine the "eqGivalencdf of minimizing 
the loss ratio to maximizing the ratio of survivors and to relate these results to those for maxi- 
mizing the difference in survivors. 
Furthermore, for the evaluation of combat strategies i t  is of interest.to consider the military 
worth (i.e. utility of military resources) of survivors. In almost all* the work that has appeared in 
the open literature [41], a linear utility has been assumed for valuation of survivors, and some form 
of net military worth (i.e. the difference between the military worth of friendly and enemy sur- 
vivors) has been taken as the payoff (i.e. criterion functional) [26, 30-33, 35, 40, 411. One reason 
for assuming such linear utilities is that of mathematical tractability: the boundary conditions for 
the dual variables do not depend on the state variable values (at least when no terminal constraint 
involving the state variables is active). 
The only study known to the authors of the consequences on nonlinear utilities for survivors 
is contained in [37], where Kawara's supporting weapon system game [20] is examined. Taylor [37J 
has determined (at least for the case in which the appropriate side's (in Kawara's case, the defender) 
supporting weapon system is not annihilated) the most general form of the criterion functional 
which leads to optimal fire-support strategies being independent of force levels, and he has shown 
that the criterion functiond chosen by Kawara [ZO] is a special case of this form. In  other words, 
Taylor has shown that Kawara's conclusion [20J that optimal fire-support strategies do not depend 
on force levels only applies to problems with the special type of criterion functional used by Kawara 
and is not true in general. No other examination of the dependence of optimal combat strategies 
on combatant objectives is known to the authors. 
3. COMPARISON OF OPTIMAL FIRE-SUPPORT POLICIES 
* 
In this section we give the fire-support doctltion problem for which the optimal policy is 
developed according to four different criterion functions. These fire-support policies are then 
compared. 
3.1. The Fire-Support Problem 
Let us consider the attack of heterogeneous X forces against the static defense of heterogeneous 
P forces along a "front.'.' Each side is composed of primary units (or infantry) and fire-support 
units (or artillery). The Xinfantry (denoted as XI and X2) launches an attack against the positions 
held by the Y infantry (denoted as Y, and Y,). We may consider XI and X2 to be infantry units 
*The only exceptions known to the authors are the papers by Chattopadhyay [9J and Kawara [20]. For example, 
in Kawara's paper [20] the payoff is the ratio of opposing infantry strengths (measured in terms of total numbers) 
at  the "end of battleJJ (see also the differentia1 game studied in Appendix D of [43]). 
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operating on spatially separated pieces of terrain. We assume that the XI infantry unit attacks 
the Yl infantry unit and similarly for X2 and Y2 with no "crossfire." (e.g. the XI infantry is not 
attrited by the Y2 infantry). We will consider only the "approach to contact" phase of the battle. 
This is the time from the initiation of the advance of the XI and X2 forces towards the Yl and Y, 
defensive positions until the XI and X2 forces actually make contact -with -the-enemy infantry in 
"hand-to-hand" combat. It is assumed that this time is fixed and known to X. 
The Xf forces begin their advance against the Yf Torces from a distance and move towards the 
Yt position. The objective of the X t  forces during the "approach to contactJ' is to close with the 
enemy position as rapidly as possible. Accordingly, small arms fire by the Xi forces is held a t  a 
minimum or firing is done "on the move" to facilitate rapid movement. I t  is not unreasonable, 
therefore, to assume that the effectiveness of X t  force "on the move" is negligible against Y,. It 
may be shown that such an approximation is necessary for reasons of mathematical tractability in 
the fire-support optimal control problem to be subsequently given. See the Appendix for further 
details. We assume, moreover, that the defensive Yf fire (for i= 1'2) causes attrition to the advanc- 
ing Xi forces in their "field of fireJJ at  a rate proportional to only the number of Yf firers. Let a t  
denote the constant of proportionality. It is convenient to refer to the attrition of a target type as 
being a "square-lawJ' process when the casualty rate is proportional to the number of enemy firers 
only and as being a "linear-law" process when it is proportional to the product of the number of 
enemy firers and remaining targets [31-331. Brackney [7] has hypothesized that a "square-law" 
attrition process occurs when the time to acquire targets is negligible in comparison with the time 
to destroy them. He has pointed out that such a situation is to be expected to occur when one force 
assaults another. Additionally, we assume that either the Y forces have no fire-support units or 
their fire support is "organic" to the Y units (i.e. fire-support units are integrated with Yf and 
only those with Y, support YJ . 
During the "approach to contact" the X fire-support units (denoted as W) deliver "area fire" 
against the Yt forces. In  other words, we assume that X's fire-support units fire into the (constant) 
area containing the enemy's infantry without feedback as to the destructiveness of this fire. Let 
$3 denote the fraction of the W fire-support units which fire a t  Y,. (We then have that 41+$2=1 
and 2 0  for i=l, 2.) Then for constant +t there are a constant number oifie-support units firing 
a t  Yf, since we assume that the W fire-support units are not in the combat zone and do not suffer 
attrition. In  this case, the Yf attrition rate is proportional to the Y, force level [19, 471. Let c t  
denote the corresponding constant of proportionality. This combat situation is shown diagram- 
matically in Figure 1. 
It is the objective of the X forces to utilize their fire-support units (denoted as W) over 
time in such a manner so as to achieve the "most favorable" situation at the end of the "approach 
to contactJJ, at  which time the force separations between opposing infantries are zero and artillery 
fires must be lifted from the enemy's positions in order not to also kill friendly forces. The "out- 
come" of this phase of battle may be measured in several difFerent ways and is quantitatively 
expressed through the criterion functional (denoted as J). Thus, we have the following optimal 
control problem for the determination of the optimal fire-support allocation policy (denoted as 
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FIGURE 1. Diagram of fire-support probIern considered for examination of effect of criterion functional on optimal 
fire-support policy. 
$*(t) for O<t< T, where T denotes the time of the end of the "approach to contact") for the W 
fire-support units : 
maximize J, 
di (0 
with stopping rule: tf-T=O, 
subject to : d t i  -- t  --atYil 
(battle dynamics) 
a!!=- 
d t &cfy, for i=l, 2, 
with initial conditions : 
xi (O)=x? and y, (O)=g: for i= l ,  2, 
and 
XI, xz y1, yzLO (State Variable Inequality Constraints), 
&+&= 1 and $i 2 0  for i= 1, 2 (Control Variable Inequality Constraints), 
where 
J denotes the criterion functional, 
xi(t) denotes the number of Xf  infantry at  time t, similarly for ydt), 
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a, is a constant (Lanchester) attrition-rate coefficient (reflecting the effectiveness of Y, 
fire against X,), 
ci is a constant (Lanchester) attrition-rate coefficient (reflecting the effectiveness of Wsup- 
porting fires against Y 0 ,  
t, (with numerical value T )  denotes the end of the optimal-con-b1 problem, and 
4 denotes the fraction of W fire support directed a t  Y, .
I t  will be convenient to consider the single control variable 4 defined by 
(2) 4=& so that &=(I-4) and 0 5 4 5 1 .  
For T<+ m i t  follows that yi(t)>O for 0 5 t S  2'. Thus, the only state variable inequality 
constraints (SVIC's) that must be considered are xf>,O. However, let us further assume that the 
attacker's infantry force levels are never reduced to zero. This assumption applies to all feasible solu- 
tions and may be militarily justified on the grounds that X would not attack the Yi positions if 
his attacking X i  forces could not survive the "approach to contact." 
3.2. The Criterion Functionals Considered 
The four criterion functionals for which the optimal fire-support alIocation policies will be 
compared are given in Table 1. All are functions only of the various numbers of combatants at  the 
end of the planning horizon (i.e. at  the end of the "approach to contact'"at which time the support- 
ing fires must be lifted for safety reasons). 
TABLE I. Summary of problem considered to study egect of criterion functional on optimal $re 
support policy. 
- - -  I problem I /  Criterion Functional, J 
The criterion functional for Problem 1 (i.e. J1= ~ i , ~ a ~ x ~  (T) /yk (T)) represents a weighted 
average of the force ratios of opposing numbers of infantry in the two infmtry combat zones. The 
rationale behind this choice is that, in each combat area, (i.e. the area of combat between X, 
and Y3 combat (possibly hand-to-hand) between the Xi and Yi forces will follow the "approach 
to contactJ' and the (initial) force ratio wil] be related to the outcome of this subsequent combat 
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action. The weighting factors (i.e. ork for k=l, 2) allow one to assign relative weights to this subse- 
quent combat between XI and Pi in the two combat areas. 
The criterion functional for Problem 2 (i.e. J Z = Z ~ , ~ V L X ~  (T)- 2; WL yk (T)) represents the 
difference between the military worths (computed using linear utilities)_-of the surviving X and Y 
forces at  the end of the "approach to contact." As noted above in Section 2, we observe that maxi- 
mizing the difference in worth of survivors is the same as minimizing the loss difference in combat 
problems (such as the one at hand) with no replacements. The criterion functional for Problem 3 
(i.e. Ja= { Z$-lvka (T) } /{Z~I1~kyk (T) 1) represents the ratio of total military worths of the 
surviving X and y forces, where~s the one, for Problem 4 (i.e. Jd=-{2~~,vk(xkL-s(T)) }/ 
{ Zi,,wk(ykO- yk (T)) }) represents the ratio of military worths of losses. Both the loss ratio and 
the loss difference have been proposed by Pugh and Mayberry [29] as appropriate payoffs for the 
evaluation of combat strategies. They state that (see p. 869 of [29]) "when the most straightforward 
estimate of a weighting factor for the loss difference is used, the two criteria are almost equivalent." 
From the study at hand, we will see that a similar statement is true: the two criteria are equivalent 
for a certain "natural" valuation of forces (see next section), but otherwise they may yield slightly 
different optimal fire-support policies. 
3.3. Optimal Fire-Support PoIicies , 
In this section we give the optimal time-sequential fie-support policies for the four problems 
presented in the previous section. As discussed above, each of these problems corresponds to a 
different decision criterion for the attackers, with all other aspects of the problem (i.e. combat 
dynamics and length of the planning horizon) being the same in all problems. In all cases we assume 
that neither qf the attacking infantry forces can be reduced to a zero force level during the approach to 
contact, i.e. problem parameters and initial force levels are such that x, (T) >O for i= 1, 2. 
For Problem 1 with J1=Z$ , ,orkg (2') /yk (T), the optimal (open-loop) fie-support policy is 
(3) 1 for OItSTwhen Fl(rlO, T)2F2(ra0, T), 0 for 0 I t  5 T when Fl (rlO, 2') 5 Fz (rzo%T) 
where r, (t) =r,=x,/y,, riO=ri (O) ,  and 
For problem 2 with J2=Z$-1vk~k(T)-Z~,lwkyk(T) and Problem 3 with Ja={Z:-lvxxk(T)}/ 
{ I.'"x1wkyk (T) }, we make the nonrestrictive assumption that 
Then the optima.1 (closed-loop) fire-support policy may be expressed in the same form for Problems 
2 and 3. I t  is best explained by considering that the battle is divided into two phases, denoted as 
Phase I and Phase 11. During Phase I for O<t<tl= T - ~ ~ ( y ~ ~ / y ~ 3 ,  the optimal policy is 
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where 
while during Phase I1 for T-r1 (y1f/y2f) 5 t ST,  the optimal policy is 
- . 
(8) 4*0, x, ?/)=I, 
and pSf denotes the final ratio (yl/y2)f such that as one works backwards from this end point, the 
optimal path leads "directly to" the "singular surface" after requiring use of the policy (8) for a 
h i t e  interval of time. We will examine below how 7, depends on whether or not inequality holds 
in (5). Furthermore, rs is the unique non-negative root of F(rs)=O, where the function F(T) is 
different for Problems 2 and 3 and is given below. For pL<pf<psf, T+ is the smaller of the two positive 
roots of G(~+;pf)=o, where the function G(7;pf) is also different for Problems 2 and 3 and is given 
below. rs and r+ may be called switching times. It has been shown that 
(a) bounds on r+ are given by 0 5 T+ < rS, 
(b) T+ is a strictly increasing function of pf for pL 5 pf<psf, and 
(c) there is no root to G(r+ ; pf )  for pf>psf. 
For Problem 2, we have 
Bounds on 7, in Problem 2 are given by (a) for wl/(alvl) I l / c l ,  
For Problem 3, we have 
1 J3w2 1 J3w1 -qr- --- 
~(7)=7+(; - =) e (cl a2 8 2  ) I  and 
Bounds on rs in Problem 3 are given by (a) for J 3 w l / ( ~ v l ) l l / c ~ ,  
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Also for Problem 3, we have 
The solution to Problem 4 is exactly like thst to Problem 3 except thst J3 in Problem 3 is replaced 
by (-Jd. 
Let us now sketch the proofs of a few statements just made above about the switching times 
.rs and 74. The existence of a unique nonnegative root to F(rs) =0 for wI/(alq) 2w2/(azv2) follows 
from F(0) 5 0  and F1(r)>O, V 720. The existence of two positive roots to G(r+; d)=0 (here the 
second argument, pf, is a (fixed) parameter) for W~/(UP~) lwzl(azv2) and pL<pf<psf follows from 
G(0)>0 for pf>pL and the fact that (letting 7 denote the unique value of 7 at which the global 
minimum of the strictly convex function G(r) occurs) G(7; d) =F(y)<O for d<pgf .  The latter is a 
consequence of aG/a#>O and G(rS; pS3 =F(rS) =O. I t  should be noted that the fact that G1(7; 
p3=O allows the parameter pf to be eliminated from GG; p3.  It also follows that there is no solu- 
tion (i.e. value of T+) to G(r+; 8 )  = O for pf>pB. The proof that arS/aJ3= - (aF/aJ3)/(aF/d~s) >O 
follows from aF/arS>0 and aF/aJa<O (the latter holding since (exp (-c1r) --1+c1r) >0). 
We will now illustrate the structure of the optimal fire-support policies for the &st three 
problems by considering some numerical examples. The basic parameter set used in the numerical 
computations is shown in Table 2. Numerical results have not been obtained for Problem 4 when 
wl/(alq) >w2/(&v2) because of the difficulty in solving the associated two-point boundary-value 
problem. The structure of the optimal policy, however, is similar to that for Problems 2 and 3, 
although switching times are, in general, very dacu l t  to determine. 
t 
TABLE 2. Bmk paramler set for numerical examples. 
*ai has units of [Xi casualties/ {(minute) X (number of Yi) ) 1. 
t e i  has units of [Yi casualties/ ((minute) X (number of Yi) ) 1. 
For Problem 1 i t  is convenient to introduce the "localJJ force ratio [36, 391 r,=xdyt, which 
represents the ratio of the numbers of opposing infantry in each of the two combat areas (sec 
Figure 1). The optimal fire-support policy is most conveniently expressed as an open-loop control 
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time for the approach to contact, 2'. Let us take crl=cr2=l.0. Then the optimal he-support policy 
is graphically depicted in Figure 2. In  the initid force-ratio space, the line with equation 
and 
is a "dispersal line" [18, 30, or 401 away from which all optimal battle trajectories flow. This is 
shown in Figure 3. In  other words, the same return is obtained from using $*=0 or 1 all of the time 
This dispersal line is determined by equating the extremal returns as a function of initial conditions 
for these two policies (see Section 4.3). In  constructing Figure 3, we have used facts like the 
following: when $=1 for O l t S T  and r2f=0, then 
FIGURE 2. Optimal (open-loop) fire-support policy for Problem 1. 
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--- - _ _  
Dispersal Line with Equation 
---.-_ 
a2 0 
r0 - ~y - rl - pa2 2 al 
I-- 
FIGURE 3. Optimd battle trajectories resdHng from optimal (open-loop) fire-support policy for Problem 1. 
For Problems 2, 3, and 4, the optimal fiesupport policy (expressed as a closed-loop control 
(see 1161 or 1351)) is most conveniently expressed in terms of yJy2 (i.e. the ratio of the numerical 
strengths of the two defending infantry forces) and r=T-t (i.e. the "b&kward~'~ time or "time 
to go" in the approach to contact). When enemy forces are valued in direct proportion to the rate 
at  which they destroy value of the friendly forces, i.9. 
(22) w,=katv, for i=l, 2, 
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the optimal fire-support policy takes a particularly simple form (denoted as policy A) : 
POLICY A: For 0 5tI T 
for Y I / Y Z > ~ ~  cz2131 (a1 CI UI), 
(23) for ~ l I ~ 2 = a 2 ~ 2 ~ 2 1 ( ~ ~ l u l ) ,  
for ~ll~z<azW2l(alclvl). -
This is shown pictorially in Figure 4 in which optimal trajectories are traced backwards in time. 
I t  is convenient to note that, for example, when +(T) =CONSTANT for 0 5 T 5 u, we have 
P(T)=P'~XP {[4~1-(l-d ~ 2 1 7 1 .  
, /  . 
In this case, r1 =0 (see (9), (1 I), and (15) above), i.e. the entire approach to contact is "Phase I. 
FIGURE 4. Diagram of optimal (closed-loop) fire-support policy (Policy A) for ProbIems 2, 3, and 4 when wll(alvl) 
= wd(azv~>. 
When enemy forces are not valued in direct proportion to the rate at  which they destroy value 
of the friendly forces (without loss of generality we may assume that wl/(al~)>wz/(~v2)), the solu- 
tions to Problems 2 and 3 are considerably more complex, as shown in Figure 5. For constructing 
this figure, we have taken v1=v2= 15.0, w1=4.0, and w2= 1.5, with other parameter values the same 
as shown in Table 2. As we have seen above, the planning horizon may be considered to consist of 
196 J. G. TAYLOR & G. G:BROWN 
two phases (denoted as Phase I and as Phase II), during each of which a different fire-support 
allocation rule is optimal. We denote this overall optimal policy as Policy B (see (6) and (8)). 
During Phase I, Policy A is optimal; whereas during Phase 11, i t  is optimal to always concentrate 
all artillery fire on Yl (which has been valued disproportionateIy high). 
CASE 'for wl/ (alvl) '> w2/ (a2v2). 
'B 
FIGURE 5. Diagram of optimal (closed-loop) fire-support policy (Policy B) for Roblem 2 when wl/(alt~l)>wz/(a&. 
(The structure of the optimal fire-support policy is similar for Problems 3 and 4.) 
The absence or presence of Phase I1 itself in the optimal time-sequential fire-support policy 
depends on the ratio of enemy infantry strengths p=ylJyz. For Problem 2, the length of Phase I1 
(i.e. ?) is independent of the ha3 force levels of the attacking friendly infantry units (i.e. sf and d )  
and depends only on p'=ylf/y2f and the combat effectiveness parameters (see equations (I)), 
whereas for Problem 3 the length of Phase I1 does depend directly on zlf and ~f through the criterion 
functional J B = { Z : _ I v k z k f J / ( 2 ~ - 1 ~ k y k f } .  Thus, we see that may be quite different for Problems 
2 and 3: for example, for the parameter set shown in Table 2 (plus force utility values vl=vz=15.0, 
w1=4.0, and wz=1.5, and terminal vdues x,*=~=200.0 and yzf=50.0), we have  problem 2)= 
7.93 minutes, while rs(Problem 3)=11.37 minutes. (For computing  problem 3) by using F(T) 
given by (is), we have used the fact that 
OPTIMAL FIRE-SUPPORT POLICIES 
to eliminate ylf from Ja) Recalling (19) and observing that 
1% / (a1 v1) I lim rs (Problem 3) = (1 /cl) In 
J J 4 -  
we see that for this parameter set the largest that  problem 3) may be is - lim-  problem 3) = 
Ja-++m 
11.55 minutes. Thus, for this parameter set, rs(Problem 2) and rs(Problem 3) may differ by at 
most fifty percent. 
3.4. Discussion of Comparison 
In  this section we will contrast the structure of the optimal fie-support policies for the four 
problems considered above. Let us recall that in all cases we have assumed that xlf, s f > O .  
For Problem 1 the optimal fire-support policy is to always concentrate all artillery fire (i.e. 
supporting fires) on just one of the two opposing enemy infantry units. This policy wili maximize 
the force ratio at  the end of the approach to contact iu one of the combat areas (i.e. xC/yl) and may 
be considered to be a "breakthrough" tactic. In  other words, one. concentrates all f i e  support on 
the key enemy unit in order to overwhelm it and effect a penetration. 
On the other hand, for Problems 2, 3, and 4 the optimal fire-support policy may involve 
splitting of fires between the two enemy troop concentrations. This property of the solution has 
been anticipated in Taylor's earlier work on the optimal control of "linear-law" Lanchester-type 
attrition processes [31, 321 (see also [43]). We may consider this policy to be an "attrition" tactic 
which aims to wear down the overall enemy strength. The structures of the optimal policies for 
Problems 2, 3, and 4 are similar, although the switching times (i.e. r+ and r8) may be appreciably 
different when enemy forces are not valued in direct proportion to the rate at  which they destroy 
value of the friendly forces. In  such a case we may assume without loss of generality that inequality 
holds in (5) ,  i.e. 
The functional dependences of these switching times are also diierent @ Problems 2, 3, and 4. 
For Problem 2 the switcding h e s  (i.e. the &transition surface) are independat of the force levels 
of the attacking friendly forces (i.e. XI and xi), as is the optimal policy itself. For Problem 3 the 
switching times depend (see (15) and (16) above) on the ratio of military worths of surviving in- 
fantry forces (computed using linear utilities), i.e. J3= { z ~ ~ ~ v ~ x ~  (T))/{l;~I1~kyt(T)) . It has been 
shown (see Section 3.3 above) that &,/dJa>O so that the larger Ja becomes, the more time 
is spent concentrating fire on Yl, although there is an upper limit to this time (see (7)). Similar 
results hold for Problem 4, only with Ja replaced by (-J4). For comparing the switching times 
between Problems 3 and 4, we note that Ja>(  - J4) if and only if Ja> { ~ ~ ~ l ~ k ~ k o ) / { ~ ~ ~ l ~ k ~ k a ) ~  
The most significant thing to be noted in comparing the optimal fie-support policies* for 
these four problems is that the entire structure of the optimal policy may be changed merely by 
changing the criterion functional. In  particular, singular subarcs (i.e. the splitting of W's fie 
*The referee has insightfully pointed out that it would be interesting to look at the payoff under one criterion 
corresponding to the optimal control under another criterion. However, this paper emphasizes the structure of the 
optimal policy rather than the effects on the payoff. 
198 J. G. TAYLOR & G. G. BROWN 
between Yi and Y2) do not appear in the solution to Problem 1, even though the necessary condi- 
tions for optimality on singular subarcs are exactly the same in all four of these problems. Such 
singular subarcs are, of course, part of the solut.ion for Problems 2, 3, and 4. 
4. DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PROBLEM-1 - -- - - 
The optimal policy is developed by application of modern optimal control theory. For Problem 
1 it is convenient to introduce the force ratio in the ith combat zone rf=x,/yf. Then Problem 1 
may be written as 
2 
maximize C (2") with T specified, 
+cQ k-1 
41+&=1, 4&0, and r ,20  for i=l, 2, 
where we recall (2). We also recall that we have assumed that ri>O. 
4.1. Necessary Conditions of Optimality 
so that the maximum principle yields the extremalcoritrol law 
1 for S4 (t)>O, 
0 for S+ (t) <0, 
where S4(t) denotes the +switching function defined by 
(29) S+ ( t ) = ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ - c a X ~ r ~ .  
'@ 
The adjoint system . . of equations (again using (2) for convenience) is given by (assuming that 
rLT)>O) 
Computing the h t  two time derivatives of the switching function 
we see that on a singular subarc (see [32] for a further discussion) we have [8, 211 
with the singular control given.by 
(33) .4s=&l(cl+c2~. 
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On such a singular subarc the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition is satisfied, since 
4.2. Synthesis of Extremals 
By an extremal we mean a trajectory on which the necessary conditions of optimality are 
satisfied. In  synthesizing extremals by the usual backwards construction procedure (see, for 
example, [30] or [XI), i t  is convenient to introduce the "backwardsJ' time defined by T= T- t. 
Rather than explicitly constructing extremals and determining domains of controllability [30, 
35, 401, it is more convenient to show that the return (i.e. value of the criterion functional) corre- 
sponding to certain extremals dominates that from others. For this purpose i t  suffices to determine 
all possible types of extremal policies, as we will now do. 
To this end, we write 
where 
(35) 
Without loss generality we may assume that R11.  Then by (31) we have 
where 8+ denotes the "backwards" time derivative & = d ~ + / d  7. Considering (31), we may write 
It follows that S+ (r)>0 and $* (r)=l, V T>O when S+ (0) 2 0  for R>1 (also when S+ (0)>0 for 
R=l). We also have S+ (T) <0 and +* (7) =0, Q 720  when S+ (0) <0 for R=L 
There may be a change in the sign of S+(7), however, when S+(O) <O for R> 1. In  this case 
+*(T) =0 for 0 5 r5r1 and then 
where il denotes the smallest value of T such that S+(rl) =O. I t  is clear that we must have &(rl) 2 0 .  
If &(TJ>o, then we have a transition surj%ce, and from (38) we find that 
where tl= T- rl. From (37) we find that 
1f &(r1)=0, the singular subarc may be entered, and then we have 
(41) TI= (1 /c2) In R. 
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In  this case we have 
where r(=r,(T) and F(R)=l+R (ln R -1). We easily see that F(R)>O for . R>1. When R=l ,  
we see that once the singular subarc is entered (in fowards time), it is never exited by an extremal 
trajectory. 
For the purposes of determining the optimal policy i t  suffices to consider the following four 
extremal policies for R 2 1 : 
(43) Policy 0: +*(t)=o for O l t l T ,  
(44) Policy 1: (6*(t)=i for O < t l T J  
1 for O<t<T-rl, 
Policy B-B: * (t) = { 
0 for T-rl<t<T, 
where rl= (1 /Q) ln R and rlO/a;l=rzO/az. The only extremal policies that we omitted here are those 
corresponding to extremals which contain a singular subarc but rlO/al #r20/a,,. I t  is readily seen from 
(34) that Policy 0 yields Rr,f/al >rZf/az, etc. We also note that corresponding to the bang-bang 
policy (45) we have 
rl ( tJ= ( s r l - 4  exp (Cltl) +a11 lfi, 
(47) 
rz (tl)=rZ0-azt120. 
4.3. Determination of the Optimal Fire-Support Policy 
I t  has not been possible to establish the optimality of a policy by citing one of the many sets 
of sflcient conditions that are available 18, 32, 351. I n  particular, althougR the planning horizon 
for the problem a t  hand is of fixed length, one camot invoke the sufficient conditions based on 
convexity of Mangasarian [24] or Funk and Gilbert [ l l ]  because the right-hand sides of the differen- 
tial equations (9) are not concave functions of r c  and (6,. As we have discussed elsewhere [31-33, 
35,401, however, the optimality of an extremal trajectory may be proven via citing the appropriate 
existence theorem for an optimal control; for the problem a t  hand there are two further subcases: 
(1) if the extremal is unique, then i t  is optimal, or (2) if the extremal is not unique and only a finite 
number exist, then the optimal trajectory is determined by considering the finite number of cor- 
responding values of the criterion functional. The existence of s measurable optimal control follows 
By Corollary 2 on p. 262 of [%I. I n  Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above, we have considered necessary con- 
ditions of optimality for piecewise continuous controls (see p. 10 and pp. 20-21 of [28]). It remains 
to show that the measurable optimal control may be taken to be piecewise continuous. This asser- 
tion may be proved by observing that if we consider the maximum principle for measurable con- 
trols (see p. 81 of [28]) in the backwards synthesis of extkemals, then the optimd control may be 
taken to be piecewise constant (and hence piecewise continuous). This last assertion follows from 
the control variable appearing linearly in the Hamiltonian (27), the control variable space being 
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compact, and the switching function (29) being continuous for 0512 T. The maximum principle 
(also singular control considerations) then yields that the optimal control must be piecewise con- 
stant almost everywhere, since S+(t) can change sign a t  most once. Hence, it may be considered 
to be piecewise constant (see p. 130 of [28]). (The authors wish to thank J. -Wingate of the Naval 
Surface Weapons Center, White Oak, for generously pointing out this type of argument.) 
We will now show that the optimal control must be constant. By the principle of optimality 
[8] i t  suEces for the purpose of showing that a singular solution is always nonoptimal to consider 
a singular extremal which begins with a singular subarc. We will show that the returns from both 
Policy B-B and also Policy S for a given point in the initial state space are dominated by the return 
corresponding to a constant extremal control. We denote the value of the criterion functional 
corresponding to Policy 0 as Jo, that corresponding to Policy B-B as Jer etc. Then we have 
J I = W ~ C ~  {(z) exp (clT)+(I?I) az c2 I -[g c12 (exp (cl 2")- 1) +a} t 
R" R (51) J . F W ~ ~ C ~  { c )  exp (KT) - Efli (R-@ exp (KT)-1) +l R ~n R+L (R- t Cl C2 ~2~ 
where cu=c2/(cl+c2), cr+p=l, and K=clc2/(cl+c2). It is convenient to define A J1-o= J1-Jo, etc., 
and then 
(52) A J ~ - ~ = c Q ~ c ~ [ R  [(FI) a1 (Bq (C1n-l)-L I C? (exp (clT)-l-~lT)] 
-[ci) (ew (c2r3-1)-4 c cz (exp (csrJ+cz[T-rl] exp (C~T~)-~-C~T)]}J 
In computing A J1-9 we assume that ~ ~ ~ / a ~ = r ~ ~ / ~ .  
We now state and prove Lemma 1. 
LEMMA 1 : Assume that R 2  1 and T2 r l .  .If A J1-020, then A J t , ~ 2 0 .  
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PROOF : (a) We consider for t > rl 
(c) If c l r l O l a ~ ,  then dr,/d t (t) 5 0  for O<t<tl so that (rlO/al) 2 (r, (tl)/al) 2r1. It follows that 
F' (t)20. If c1rI0>al, then F' (t)>O. Thus, we already have F' (t) 2 0  for t l r l .  
(d) By (a) and (c), we have F(t) 20, whence follows the lemma. Q.E.D. 
LIZMMA 2: Assume that R 2 l .  Then for tl= T - ~ ~ 2 0 ,  we have A J 0 - & O  with A Jo-B>O for 
t1>0. 
PROOF: (a) We consider for t120 
F(tl)=-R {(A) a1 (exp (c2t1)-1)-L 2 C? (exp (cltl)-1-cltl)} 
We observe that F(O)=O. 
(b) We compute that 
R 1 a2 F' (t3 = - - al IT [(clrc-al) exp (cl td +al]} +expzr1){r20 exp ( ~ t , ) -  (exp (c2 13-I)] 
Considering (22) and (30), we find that for t120 we have 
(c) Recalling (47) that r20/@ 2 tl , we have for t120 
since for t 2 0  we have g (t) 1 0 ,  where g(t) =t (exp (Q t) -1) - (exp (c2 t) - 1-c2t) /c2. The latter result 
follok from g(O)=O and g' (t)20,Vt 1 0 .  
. (dl Thus, F(tl) 20, V t120, whence follows the lemma. Q.E.D. 
As an immediate consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2 and analogous results for R<1, we have 
Theorem 1. 
THEOREM 1: For T2r1>0, we have max (Jo, J I ) > J B  with strict inequality holding for 
T>r1. 
We next consider Lemma 3. 
LEMMA 3: Assume that R 2 1  and T2r1. Then-we have AJ1-&O with AJ1-s>O for R>1 
or T>r*, 
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PROOF : (a) We consider for t 2 0  
F(t)=t { (R exp (C~~) - I ) /C~-  (Re exp K t  -1)/K) f R(R-6 exp (KT)-1-Kt/R) /K2 
-R (exp (clt)-l-c1 T/R)/c12+ (R In R)-/(clcl)+(R-l)/cza. 
Then we have 
with f (R)>O for R>1. The latter result follows from f (l)= f '(l)=O and f "(R) = (l-R-fl)/(clczR) 
>O, b' R>1. 
(b) Computing F' (t) =Rat {RP exp (clt) -exp (Kt)) 2R"t (exp (cIt) -exp (Kt)) >O for R 2  1 and 
t>O, we see from (a) that F(t; R ) 2 0  with F(t; R)>O for R>1 or t>O. 
(c) We now consider G(t) = (R exp (clt) -l)/cl- (Ra exp (Kt) - l)/K. It follows that G(0) 
= l/cd- R/cl- Ra/K=g(R) 2 0, since g(1) = 0 and g' (R) = (1 - R-8)/cl. Also, G' (t) = R" {R@ exp ( clt) 
-exp (Kt) j 2 0. Hence, G(t) 2 0. 
(d) Recalling that rIo/allT, we have by (c) that AJl-i2a2~caF(T; R) 2 0  with F(T; R)>O 
for R>1 or T>q. Q.E.D. 
From Lemma 3 and the analogous result for R 5  1, Theorem 2 follows. 
THEOREM 2: Assume that 2'271. Then max (Jo, JI)  2 Js with inequality holding for 11>~~. 
Thus, we see from Theorems 1 and 2that  the optimal control must be constant and equal to either 
0 or 1 for O<t< T. The results given in section 3.3 (see, in particular, Figures 2 and 3) then follow 
from consideration of AJ1_, (see (52)). 
5. DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PROBLEM 2 
In. this case we consider (1) with the criterion function 
Thus, for this problem the state space (considering time to be an additional state variable) is five- 
dimensional. 
5.1. Necessary Conditions of Optimality 
The Hamiltonian [8] is given by (using (2)) 
so that the ma&um principle yields the extremal control law 
1 1 for Sb(t)>O, 4*(t)= o for sb(t)  <O, 
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where St$(t) denotes the +switching function defined by 
(57) fJ,(t)=c1 (-q1)311-C2 (-~2)~2.  
The adjoint system of equations (again using (2) for convenience) is given by (assuming that 
zc(T)>O) - - 
pc(t)=vi for 0 5 t s T w i t h  i=l, 2, and 
ii=a,vi++?ciqi with pi (T)= - wi for i=l, 2. 
Computing the first two time .derivatives of the switching function 
with the singular control given by 
(61) 4s=czl(c1 +Q). 
On such a singular subarc the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition is satisfied, since 
For Problem 1 i t  was convenient to consider a "reducedJy state space consisting of t, rl= zl/yl, 
and r2, while for Problem 2 we me considering the "fullJJ state space of t, q, s, yl, and y2. It seems 
appropriate to point out the corresponding relation between the adjoint variables in these two 
state spaces. This relation is easily seen by considering the optimal return function [8], denoted as 
W, and the following transformation of variables: 
(62) t=t and r,=z,/y, for i=l, 2. 
Then we have, for example, 
aw a w a ~  
= -  >, 
~ , ( t ) - ~ ~  ( t )  a ~ ,  axf 
so that we obtain 
(63) p,=X</y, and q,=-r,X</y, for i=l, 2. 
Let us also note that, alternatively, Problem 1 could have been solved in the "fullJJ state space of 
t ,  XI, ail yl, and y2, while Problem 2 cannot be solved in the "reducedJJ state space. The latter con- 
clusion follows from considering (58) and the requirement (see (63) above) that p Jq ,= - l/ri must 
hold for the transformation (62) to be applicable. 
s.2. Synthesis of Extrernals 
In  synthesizing extremals by the usual backwards cozlstruction procedure it is convenient to 
consider 
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and 
and 
where r denotes the "backwards" time defined by r= T-t, and &, denotes the "backwards" 
time derivative &=d~+/dr .  We omit most of the tedious details of the synthesis of extremals 
because of similarity to those in 1321. Without loss of generality we may assume that (5) holds, and 
then there are two cases to be considered: (I) wll(alv~) = w21(azv2) ,'and (11) wl/(alvl)> w~ / ( cc~v~ ) .  
CASE I: w1/(alvl)=w2/(w2) ;i.e. wi=kapi for i=l, 2. 
In this case (64) becomes 
whence follows the synthesis of extremals shown in Figure 4. 
CASE I1 : w~l(cclvJ >w2l(&vz). 
In  this case i t  follows from (56)) (64), and (65) that for d=ylf/y2f2~~2~zI(a1cIvl), we have 
S4(7)>0 and +*(r)=1 for all r>0. Since S+(O) SO=) $,(0)<0, it follows that for 
we have S+(r)<O and +*(r)=O for a11 r>0. 
There may be a change in the sign of S#(T), however, for %zt5/(c1wJ < P ~ < ~ ~ ~ ~ V ~ / ( ~ I C I V I ) .  I n  
this case +* ( r )  = 1 for 0 5 r 5 r1 and then 
It is clear that we must have S+(rl) 50. If 8#(r1)<0, then we have s Bansition suda-ce with r1 
(denoted as 7,) given by the smaller of the two positive roots of 6( r+ ;  pfj =0, where 6 ( r ;  p') is given 
by (12). If S+(rl)=O, a singular subarc may be entered, and then we have that r1 (denoted as 7s) 
is given by the unique nonnegative root of F(rs)=OJ where F(T)  is given by (11). We denote the 
corresponding value of pf as psf. Then there is no switch in +* for pf> psf. We state this result as 
Theorem 3. 
THEOREM 3 :  +*(r)=l for all 7 1 0  when d>psr. 
PROOF: Immediate by G(rS; pSf)=F(3=0 and i3G/i3pf>Ol since then there is no solu- 
tion to G(q ;  p') =0 for pf> pSf. Q.E.D. 
The bounds on r s  given by (13) and (14) are developed as follows. First assume that w l / ( ~ ~ v l )  l 
l/cl and consider F( r )  = T+ [ l /cl-wlj(qvl)) exp (-cIr) - {l/cl-202/(a2vz)). Then c,wl/(a?s) I F 1 ( 7 )  
<I and F f l ( r )  2 0  for wl/(alvl) < l / c l ,  whence follow the bounds given by (13). Other developments - 
are similar. 
The .above information immediately leads to the extremal field shown in Figure 5 (see dso 
Section 3.3). 
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5.3. Determination of the Optimal Fire-Support Policy 
The optimdity of the extremal £ire-support policy developed above follows according to the 
reasoning given in Section 4.3 by the uniqueness of extremals. 
.. - - 
6. DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PROBLEM 3 
In  this case we consider (I) with the criterion functional 
6.1. Necessary Conditions of Optimality 
The necessary conditions of optimality for Problem 3 are the same as those for Problem 2 
except that the boundary conditions for the adjoint variables are merent.  Thus, (55) through (57) 
also apply to Problem 3. The adjoint system of equations (again using (2) for convenience) is given 
by (assuming that xt(T)>O) 
(67) 
where 
pi(t)=vt/D for O l t  S T  with i=l, 2, and 
4t=atpt+&~tq, with qt(T)=-wtJa/D for i=l, 2, 
Computing the h t  two time derivatives of the switching function 
(68) & (t)=-alc,ptyl+azc2~2~2, and 36 (t) =alclp, yl (cld -a2c2~~~2 (c2 (1-41, 
we find that (60) and (61) again hold on a singular subarc. On such a singdar subarc the generalized 
Legendre-Clebsch condition is satisfied, since 
6.2. Synthesis of Extremals 
The synthesis of extremals is essentially the same as for Problem 2 (see Section 5.2 above) 
except that we have 
and 
(70) 
It follows that 
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6.3. Determination of the Optimal Fire-Support Policy 
As for Problem 2, the optimality of the extremd fire-support policy developed above follows 
according to the reasoning given in Section 4.3 by the uniqueness of extrernals. 
- - - 
7. DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PROBLEM 4 
In this case we consider (1) with the criterion functional 
The necessary conditions of optimality for Problem 4 are the same as those for Problems 2 and 3, 
except that the boundary conditions for the adjoint variables are different: a t  t=T we have 
(72) pt(T)=v,/Dl and q,(T)=-wi(-J4)/D1 for i= l ,  2, 
Consequently, the solution to Problem 4 is exactly the same as that to Problem 3, except that J a  
in the solution to Problem 3 is replaced by (-J4). Because of the dependence of J4 on the initial 
force levels x:, yiO for i= l ,2 ,  the two-point boundary-value problem which arises in tEe determine 
tion of switching times when (25) holds is very difficult to solve. 
8. DISCUSSION 
In this section we discuss what we have learned about the dependence of the structure of 
optimal time-sequential fire-support policies on the quantification of military objectives. We 
studied this dependence by considering four specific problems (each corresponding to a different 
quantification of objectives, i.e. criterion functional) for which solutions werdeveloped by modern 
optimal control theory. 
Our most significant finding is that essentially the entire structure of the optimal fire-support 
policy may be changed by modifying the quantification of military objectives. We feel that there 
are b&ically two types of military strategies: (1) to obtain a "localJJ advantage, and (2) to obtain 
an "overall" advantage. The criterion function for Problem 1 (i.e. 
a weighting ofthe h a 1  force ratios in the two separate combat areas) reflects the striving to attain 
a "local" advantage (referred to above txs a "breakthrough" tactic). The corresponding optimal 
fire-support policy was to concentrate all supporting$res on one of the enemy units (the quantita- 
tive determination of this policy is given in Section 3.3) for the entire period of Ere support. How- 
ever, we have assumed that the X commander has peflect information about the state variables 
(e.g. enemy force levels) and dl Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients (i.e. system parameters). I n  
the real world where this assumption may not hold, this policy need not be optimal. Other factors 
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that would temper the use of such a poIicy in the real world are (1) the need to "pin down" enemy 
forces with supporting fires (i.e. suppressive effects), and (2) the giving of information to the enemy 
as to exactly where his defenses will be attacked by the concentration of preparatory fires only 
there. 
- -.. 
On the other hand, the criterion functionals for Problems 2, 3, and 4 reflect the striving to 
attain an "overall1' advantage (referred to above as an "attrition" tactic which aims to wear down 
the overall enemy strength). The corresponding optimal fire-support policies for Problems 2, 3, 
and 4 were qualitatively the same and could involve a splitting of supportingJires between the two 
enemy troop concentrations. This property of the optimal fiedistribution policy is not present in 
the solution to Problem 1 and was anticipated by our earlier work on optima1 fire distribution 
against enemy target types which undergo attrition according to a "linear-law" process (see Section 
3.1 above) [31, 321. The criterion functional for this earlier work was the difference between the 
overall military worths of friendIy and enemy survivors. Thus, we see that nonconcentration of 
fires on particular target types is characteristic of optimal time-sequential fire distribution over 
enemy target types which undergo attrition according to a t!linear-law'l process with the objective 
of attaining an t'overall" advantage. 
We saw that the structures of the optimal fire-support policies for Problems 2, 3, and 4 were 
qualitatively similar. In fact, when one (i.e. the X commander) values enemy (i.e. Y) forces in each 
of the two combat zones in direct proportion to their rate (per unit of individual weapon system) 
of destroying the value of opposing friendly forces, the optimal policies were exactly the same for 
all three problems (see Section 3.3). In this case the optimal fie-support policy took the particularly 
simple form of Policy A as given by (6). 
When enemy survivors were not valued in direct proportion to their rate of destruction of 
friendly value, the optimal policies were Merent and more complex (see Section 3.3, in particular 
Figure 5), and the planning horizon may be considered to be divided into two phases, denoted as 
Phase I and Phase 11. The lengths of these two phases depended on different factors in these three 
problems, and the timing of changes in the allocation of supporting £ires could be appreciably 
different. When the planning objective was the maximization of the diffe~ence in the total military 
worths of friendly and enemy forces a t  the end of the "approach to co8tact," the length of, for 
example, Phase I1 (during which all f i e  is concentrated on PI) depended only on the attrition-rate 
9 
coefficients and enemy force levels and was independent of the friendly,attacking-force levels. 
When the ~atio of the totd worth of sunriving friendly and enemy forus was considered (i.e. for 
Problem 3), the length of Phase I1 also depended directly on the attacking friendly force levels, 
while when the ratio of the total worths of friendly and enemy tosses was considered, i t  dso depended 
on the initial total worths of forces. 
Thus, we see that (at least for the relatively simple fire-support allocation problem considered 
here) the structure of the optimal time-sequential allocation policy may be strongly influenced by 
the quanti5ca;tion of military objectives. Moreover, the most important planning decision appw- 
ently is whether. a side will seek to attain an "overall" advantage or a "local" advantage. We 
hope that our investigation has provided a better understanding of the dependence of the struc- 
ture of optimal fie-support stra;tegies on combatant objectives. In  conclusion, it appears to us 
that more such specific cases warrant investigation for developing a theory of optimal combat 
strategies. 
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APPENDIX 
Fire-Support Allocation Problem in Which Xt's Fire on Yt is Not Neglected 
~ h k n  Xi's fire effectiveness against Yt is not assumed to be . negligible,-the . .  . - -. fire-support - d o -  
cation problem (1) considered in the main text becomes 
with stopping rule: t,-T=O, 
subject to : ax, -I- d t  n,?/, 
(battle dynamics) 
dyt - 
d t - - bizf-rpic,y, for i=l, 2 
with 
d ~ + h = l ,  andrpc10 ' for i=l, 2. 
Unfortunately, the optimal policy to (A.l), for example, for the criterion functional J1 does not 
take a simple form at all [44]. It appears that without the approximation used in the main text 
(i.e. bi=O), it is essentially impossible to analytically develop deep insights into the structure of 
the optimal policy. See Appendix A in the report by Taylor [44] for further details. Since our goal 
has been to investigate the dependence of the optimal policy on the quantification of objectives 
(see also Taylor [37]), we have chosen to study the simpler problems. 
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